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To what extent is accountability key to realising rights? In struggles over access to water, 
conflicts between market- and rights-based frameworks imply distinct strategies of 
accountability. The former implies consumers holding service providers to account. In 
this understanding, citizens are consumers and accountability is exercised through the 
implied contract, mediated by the market, between customer and water utility, even if the 
state remains responsible for regulating private service providers to ensure they meet the 
needs of the poor. Rights-based frameworks assume that accountability claims will be 
pursued through and mediated by the state. This confers upon the state the power to both 
respect and deny rights, the consequences of which are explored below. 
 
In the past decade, the rights discourse has gained currency in international development. 
A human rights approach to development is seen as moving away from looking at charity 
or handouts to empowerment and securing firm rights to ‘the requirements, freedoms and 
choices necessary for life and development in dignity’ (Hausermann 1998). Despite the 
fact that support for the human rights movement has been growing considerably and a 
                                                          
1. The empirical material in this chapter was generated through research conducted for the DfID-funded 
Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern African research programme and some sections of the chapter draw on 
Mehta and Ntshona (2004). I am very grateful to all my interview partners in South Africa for sharing their 
knowledge with me and to Zolile Ntshona for his insights and meticulous research. I thank Nurit 
Bodemann-Ostow and Paul Wright for their research assistance and competent internet searches. 
Comments by Carlos Cortez, the editors, Ian Scoones and Lisa Thompson helped strengthen the chapter. 
However, all responsibility for the errors that remain rests with me.  
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human rights approach to development is now fairly mainstream, there is a growing 
acknowledgement that many of the world’s poor and marginalised have yet to enjoy the 
benefits of these rights. There are many possible reasons for this.  
 
First, sins of omission may deny citizens access to social and economic rights. It is well 
known that poor states may not prioritise the provision of education, water and housing 
for all. Also, many developing countries lack the resources to make good the rights that 
allow all citizens to live a life of dignity, or the institutional capacity to establish these 
rights. Conversely, citizens may not be aware of their rights and may not have the 
capacity to mobilise around them. Second, sins of commission may deprive people of 
rights. The rights of vulnerable people may knowingly be put at risk or even violated for 
a variety of reasons. For example, freedom of speech and the right to protest are severely 
restricted under dictatorships. Moreover, as this chapter demonstrates, states and global 
players may introduce macroeconomic policies that violate basic rights in the name of 
development or growth. It is, however, the lack of mechanisms of accountability and poor 
regulation on the part of states that allow both sins of omission and commission to 
flourish, preventing economic and social rights from becoming real.  
 
Accountability is usually seen as the means through which the less powerful can hold 
more powerful actors to account (Goetz and Jenkins 2004). Traditionally, it is 
governments that are mainly responsible for protecting people’s rights, but there is an 
increasing need to hold private sector and global actors to account for policies and 
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programmes that have a far-reaching impact on the rights and well-being of poor and 
vulnerable people. Diffuse and unclear rules of accountability for global players and non-
state players are problematic when most human rights declarations focus on states as the 
primary deliverers and protectors of rights.  
 
Rights claiming is a way to demand accountability from powerful players. But, as this 
chapter demonstrates, accountability is an issue that is still missing from many human 
rights debates. For the Millennium Development Goals and other processes to be 
successful, attention must be paid to several contradictions and questions. Do paradoxical 
outcomes arise from a dual commitment to markets and rights, compromising people’s 
basic rights while making it difficult to enforce accountability mechanisms? Can poor 
institutional capacity and low resource allocation impede the realisation of economic and 
social rights? Do the necessary accountability mechanisms exist to hold the powerful to 
account? Is there an ambiguity about responsibilities and duty bearers when economic 
and social rights are violated?  
 
This chapter focuses on these issues and questions by examining the right to water in 
South Africa.2 In 2002, the UN Economic, Social and Cultural Council gave a lot of 
prominence to the right to water through its General Comment No. 15, which applies an 
                                                          
2 The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in Geneva, which has done extensive research on 
the right to water, clearly lays down the legal basis for the right to water (COHRE 2004). At the 1977 
United National Water Conference, the Mar del Plata Declaration recognised that all peoples ‘have the 
right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs’. It has 
subsequently been recognised explicitly in several legally binding treaties, such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 (CEDAW), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989) and, more recently, in the General Comment 15.  
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authoritative interpretation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), ratified by 148 states. The Comment, not a legally 
binding document, stated explicitly that the right to water is a human right and that 
responsibility for the provision of sufficient, safe, affordable water to everyone, without 
discrimination, rests with the state. States are thus clearly responsible for progressively 
realising the right to water.  
 
Here I examine both the ideological currents underpinning the water debate in South 
Africa and its institutional, administrative and policy environment in order to understand 
the importance of accountability in realising the right to water. The chapter draws on 
empirical research conducted in 2002 and 2003. Interviews were conducted with NGO 
representatives, villagers, academics, policy makers and private sector representatives in 
Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg and in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa.  
 
Dancing to the two tunes of rights and markets?  
South Africa is the only country that recognises the human right to water at both the 
constitutional and policy level. Moreover, its Free Basic Water (FBW) policy goes 
against the grain of conventional wisdom in the water sector, which stresses cost recovery 
mechanisms and shies away from endorsing the human right to water (Mehta 2003). 
Since early 2000, the Department for Water Affairs and Forestry has been investigating 
providing a basic level of water free to all citizens. In February 2001 the government 
announced that it was going to provide a basic supply of 6,000 litres of safe water per 
month to all households free of charge (based on an average household size of eight 
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people). The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 states that a basic level of water should be 
provided to those who cannot pay, and the FBW policy emanates from the legal 
provisions of the Act. The main source of funding for this initiative is the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant, a conditional capital grant for the provision of infrastructure, and the 
Equitable Share Grant, an unconditional grant from the central government to local 
authorities intended for operational expenditure. The latter amounts to about R7.5 billion 
a year [currency conversion], and is from national taxes for the provision of basic 
services.3  
 
While the government of South Africa stands alone internationally in endorsing the 
constitutional right to water, its policies have been informed by several dominant water 
management frameworks, which include an emphasis on cost recovery as well as a shift 
in the role of the state from direct provider of water-related goods and services to a more 
regulatory function, with privatisation seen as the means to overcome the past failure of 
public systems to provide water to the poor. Government policies draw on a quasi-
consensus amongst multilateral and bilateral agencies on issues such as cost recovery, 
user fees, and demand management, manifested in both poor countries and middle-
income settings like South Africa. For example, several authors have demonstrated the 
extent to which the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) have 
shifted South African government thinking away from its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) commitments in infrastructure and service provision, 
based on entitlement and welfare, towards a cost-recovery approach that can deprive poor 
                                                          
3 DWAF official, personal communication by email, 16 May 2005.  
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communities of their basic right to an adequate provision of water (Pauw 2003; Bond 
2001; 2002). In 1996 total cost recovery became an official policy of the government 
when it adopted its fiscally conservative Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
macroeconomic policy (GEAR). The central features of the policy are a reduced role for 
the state, fiscal restraint and the promotion of privatisation. 
 
Thus, alongside the remarkable commitments to providing free water, several policy 
changes were introduced under World Bank influence (Pauw 2003; Bond 2001). These 
include the ‘credible threat of cutting service’ to non-paying consumers, a move which 
has been linked by some to cholera and other gastrointestinal outbreaks (Pauw 2003; 
McDonald 2002). From 1997 municipalities began to witness widespread cut-offs of 
basic services to non-payers (ibid.). As the cost-recovery principle was applied, 
households that used more than the basic amount, and found themselves unable to pay, 
faced disconnections. In the case of Manquele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 2001 JOL 8956 (D), the High Court found that the City Council had a right to 
disconnect the water supply of the applicant, Mrs Manquele, because she chose not to 
limit herself to the water supply provided to her free of charge. However, commentators 
argue that by completely disconnecting her water supply the municipality deprived Mrs 
Manquele even of the free basic amount; this was problematic, since the right to a basic 
level of water supply exists notwithstanding the ability to pay (Community Law Centre 
2002). While cut-offs took place even during apartheid times (when non-payment for 
services was a form of political resistance),4 the level of public indignation is 
                                                          
4 Barry Jackson, personal communication, 23 December 2003. 
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undoubtedly higher today, not least because of the strong importance attached to 
economic and social rights in South Africa’s constitution.  
 
There are controversies over the number of people who have experienced cut-offs. 
According to the Municipal Services Project, using representative national survey data 
from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), ten million people have 
experienced cut-offs in recent years (McDonald 2002). This figure is contested, however, 
and has been refuted by the Department for Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) (Kasrils 
2003) and further revised by the HSRC to approximately 2 per cent of all connected 
households, or over 250,000 people. Despite DWAF’s admission that such numbers are a 
matter of serious concern, McDonald stands by the figure of ten million and has 
challenged DWAF and other agencies to research a more accurate figure (Sunday 
Independent 2003). DWAF maintains, nevertheless, that under certain conditions cut-offs 
are permissible on the legal basis of the Strategic Framework for Water Services.5  
 
As part of GEAR, the South African government also reduced grants and subsidies to 
local municipalities and city councils. This forced cash-strapped local authorities to turn 
towards privatisation as well as to enter into partnerships in order to generate the revenue 
no longer provided by the national state (McKinley 2003). Since local government 
structures were incapable of dealing with past backlogs on their own, they began to 
privatise public water utilities by entering into service and management partnerships with 
external agencies. These ranged from multinational water corporations to South African 
Chapter 3 
Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability 
 
 8
firms. The role of consortia was also key. For example, Suez, which collaborated with the 
apartheid government in providing water largely to the white minority, formed Water and 
Sanitation Services Africa (WSSA). It subsequently won ‘delegated management’ 
contracts in Queenstown, Fort Beaufort and Stutterheim (all in the Eastern Cape) (Bond 
et al. 2001). Ruiters (in Pauw 2003), who researched water privatisation in these three 
towns, argues that water tariffs increased up to 300 per cent between 1994 and 1999. 
Pauw (2003) argues that by 1996 a typical township household was paying up to 30 per 
cent of its income for water, sewerage and electricity. Average income in the area at the 
time was less than US$60 per month, with more than 50 per cent unemployed. Those 
who could not pay their bills (the majority) were cut off and in Queenstown special debt 
collectors were appointed and a reinstatement fee was introduced that was almost twice 
the average township income. 
 
Implementing FBW: experiences from the Eastern Cape  
 
The Eastern Cape is the poorest of South Africa’s nine provinces, with a predominantly 
rural population, high unemployment, and poor access to social services. Located on the 
south-eastern coast, the Eastern Cape province accounts for approximately 16 per cent of 
South Africa’s population. Of all Equitable Share Grants to the nine provinces, the 
Eastern Cape receives 17–18 per cent (National Treasury 1999; 2004). Research was 
conducted in two district municipalities in the former Transkei.6 The Alfred Nzo District 
Municipality (ANDM) is one of the poorest district municipalities in the Eastern Cape. It 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 DWAF official, personal communication by email, 16 May 2005.  
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has 50 per cent unemployment and no manufacturing industry to curb the problem.7 
Across ANDM’s large, poor rural population, 214 villages have a reliable water supply, 
whilst more than 400 villages do not have any water scheme whatsoever. ANDM is one 
of the poorest district municipalities in the Eastern Cape. The O. R. Tambo District 
Municipality is slightly larger, with a population of over 1.6 million and an 
unemployment rate of 51.8 per cent. Currently available statistics indicate that only 13.2 
per cent have acceptable access to safe water (SSA 2002). 
 
The FBW policy was conceived by DWAF at the national level, but its implementation 
rests with local authorities, including district and local municipalities, who are designated 
water services authorities (local municipalities, however, have to apply to be water 
services authorities). Although they are free to interpret it according to the resources and 
capacity available, operationalising the policy has been difficult. After all, the mere 
endorsement of the principle of social justice does not determine how resources are to be 
distributed. Instead, the distribution of resources and the implementation of rights-based 
approaches are usually at the discretion of professionals and bureaucrats in the public 
sector, who lack a clear directive on how to ‘implement justice’ (Plant 1992: 20). This 
certainly echoes the experiences of officials in South Africa’s Eastern Cape. Many 
worked in bureaucracies of the former homelands and inherited a massive backlog in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Mehta and Ntshona (2004) for more details. 
7 Interview with the Deputy Director, Water and Sanitation, Alfred Nzo District Municipality, 10 December 
2002. 
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1994. They also struggle to grapple with the many political and institutional changes 
arising through South Africa’s decentralisation process.8 
 
Many of the poorer district municipalities lack financial and institutional resources to 
implement the policy, despite Equitable Share Grants. Monitoring and rationing the quota 
of free water is also very difficult. Often, it can cost more to install a water meter than to 
provide the water free.9 In some cases, the FBW policy has also made charging for water 
difficult. Many communities understood that they would now stop paying for water 
(Jackson 2002), making it increasingly difficult for cash-strapped district municipalities 
to raise the money required.  
 
How do poor municipalities such as ANDM raise the money to ensure water delivery? 
The ANDM authorities believe that it is too costly to charge for water in rural areas. They 
have been down that road in the past and find it an administrative burden to try to collect 
tariffs. Moreover, many of the schemes were underutilised – Build–Operate–Train–
Transfer (BOTT) schemes, for example, which relied on expensive technology and 
outside experts rather than local knowledge and expertise. Existing pre-paid schemes 
were highly underutilised and most people continued to use natural sources of water such 
as untreated streams. Those using the pre-paid scheme were only collecting an average of 
three litres of water per person per day, which meant that a million-rand investment could 
                                                          
8 Budget cuts have gone hand in hand with decentralisation in South Africa (Manor 2001). The function of 
water services provision is now performed by the municipality itself or by other public or private bodies. 
While this process devolves power to local authorities and gives more voice to ordinary citizens, it can also 
lead to shedding of functions and the dumping of ‘unfunded mandates’ on lower levels of government, 
which poor rural municipalities are not able to implement (Olver 1998). 
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not yield the benefits intended and remained underutilised. Moreover, the scheme was not 
addressing the problems of health and the need to free women from long-distance water 
collection. It is for this reason that ANDM moved away from the policy of cost recovery 
and is now implementing the FBW policy. ANDM has not announced the policy to the 
entire district municipality, however, lest serious financial problems arise in 
implementing it. Thus many people in the Eastern Cape, especially in the remote rural 
areas, are not even aware of the policy of FBW.  
 
Free water or basic water?  
It has been argued that FBW is difficult to realise in rural areas dogged by a massive 
backlog with respect to water supply and sanitation. In ANDM in 2003, 132 villages 
(with a population of about 170,000 people) were being serviced with basic schemes. By 
2010 the district municipality plans to serve 420 villages (a population of about 540,000 
people), still only 63 per cent of the villages in the entire district. 
 
Clearly a long road lies ahead in ensuring water for all. ANDM has to consider both the 
free basic water policy as well as basic water for all. In principle, basic water for all takes 
precedence in the work of ANDM, together with sanitation priorities. However, there is a 
trade-off in implementing free water for some and basic water for all. ANDM has 
contracted consultants to develop business plans for priority villages within the 
municipality. A village with a high population size, a clinic and/or a school is generally 
high on the list of priorities. However, if a priority village is next to a village with low 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Interview with DWAF official, Mount Ayliff, 23.04.2002. 
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priority, the consultants have to develop a business plan that encompasses both villages 
as one project, because people in the next village would fail to understand why they are 
being bypassed whilst the other village is earmarked to get a water scheme. Indeed, 
failure to recognise adjacent villages could result in pipes being destroyed and water 
thefts. 
 
In order to ensure that basic water is provided, ANDM has introduced play pumps as 
interim measures in villages unlikely to receive water in the near future.10 The play 
pumps are also supposed to curb the problem of cholera, which in the beginning of 2003 
was a problem in other district municipalities. Play pumps cost anything between 
R20,000 and R100,000 with a reservoir [currency conversion?]. Thus, despite good 
intentions, district municipalities such as ANDM and O. R. Tambo are finding it difficult 
to realise FBW for all. In part this delay is due to the legacy inherited in 1994, combined 
with both financial and institutional constraints. At the time of writing, 55.2 per cent of 
the country’s poor population was being served by FBW (DWAF 2005). In 2003, two 
years after the policy had been announced, only 50 per cent of the communities had 
implemented FBW (COSATU 2003). 
 
Livelihood and poverty reduction impacts  
The FBW policy was not intended to address redistribution issues, and there are other 
provisions in the National Water Act (for example, compulsory licensing) that deal with 
                                                          
10 Play pumps are designed in such a way that anyone can operate them. Children, who can get on and off 
the wheel as they play, can turn the horizontal wheel.  
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these. Still, we need to ask how it contributes to poverty reduction and wider social 
justice concerns. For example, it is intended that the 25 litres of water will be used 
primarily for drinking and cooking purposes. However, the poor also need to be assured 
of water during scarcity periods for their farming activities based on subsistence. The 25 
litres a day policy largely applies to domestic water supply, and not to wider concerns of 
livelihood security and how to restructure existing water-user practices.  
 
While the Committee on Economic and Social Rights does not lay down particular 
standards on how much water should be provided, it states that water supply must be 
sufficient for personal and domestic use, correspondent to WHO standards stipulating a 
minimum of 50–100 litres per day with an absolute minimum of 20 litres per day 
(COHRE 2004: 8). Thus South Africa is providing close to the absolute minimum.11 This 
is why trade union leaders and other advocates argue that the South African state should 
grant everybody at least 50 litres of water per day per capita. This, they argue, is the only 
way in which poor farmers can successfully maintain their livelihoods and thus escape 
the trap of poverty and dependence on pensions.  
 
Do enforceable social and economic rights make a difference to people’s lives and 
livelihoods? As demonstrated above, rights-based approaches may not necessarily 
radically redistribute resources in a society. But do they make a difference to poor people, 
and what are local-level village experiences of FBW? I draw on Zolile Ntshona’s 
interviews in two villages in the Eastern Cape (see Mehta and Ntshona 2004) to show 
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how the daily lives of three rural women, of which two are pensioners and one is 
unemployed, have been affected by FBW. Mabombo is 61 years old and is entitled to an 
old age pension. Before the implementation of the FBW policy, she used to collect water 
from the spring far from her house, and used a ten-litre container to make two or three 
trips to the spring before sunrise. Collection from the spring was difficult for her because 
she had to wait for the sediments to settle before pure water emerged. She now feels that 
life has improved. She does not have to wake up in the morning before the livestock 
make the spring water murky and can concentrate her energy on other work. She uses the 
FBW for washing, drinking and cooking, though she still visits the spring to wash 
blankets. Mathungu, 70 years old, also supports a large family with her old age pension 
grant. She could not afford the R10 [currency conversion] to pay for water services in her 
village before the implementation of the FBW policy. She, too, no longer needs to make 
arduous trips to the spring on a daily basis. Masakala is an unemployed member of the 
water committee. Her main complaints under the FBW regime are the rules for water use. 
She feels that when she paid R10 a month for water she used as much as she wanted, but 
since the FBW policy there are restrictions, and she occasionally needs to pay for 
additional water.  
 
Clearly, FBW has made a significant difference to the everyday lives of people like 
Mathungu, Masakala and Mabombo. For one thing, it frees women from the time taken to 
collect water and the health benefits are clear, since they do not need to resort to 
unprotected streams. However, the issue of poverty alleviation raises questions because 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Of course what counts as ‘sufficient water’ is controversial. It is known that people can also survive on 
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of the restrictions imposed by the FBW policy. For example, water cannot be used or is 
not enough for agricultural production, which could alleviate poverty in the area. The 
ANDM has stated categorically that it needs to prioritise basic water provision largely for 
drinking and washing for all the villages first, before upgrading schemes for agricultural 
production. 
 
In Mdudwa village, a gravity-fed scheme was implemented in 2001. The scheme has 
seven standpipes, of which six were working when the scheme started operating. In 2003, 
only three taps were still in operation. There is a compulsory fee of R5 at Mdudwa, which 
every household is expected to contribute towards operation and maintenance. Most 
people in the village have refused to pay the fee because the standpipes closest to their 
households are not working, while others are not paying because they cannot afford to 
pay. Still others do not want to pay because they are unhappy with the conditions of the 
scheme. For instance, the communities require large amounts of water for cultural 
purposes, such as the practice of washing blankets for funerals and other ceremonies. The 
scheme does not provide enough water for these activities. Therefore, since the scheme 
has not improved people’s livelihoods and has also imposed restrictions on water use for 
activities which are important to them, people generally perceive it as useless. Finally, 
there are also many people in Mdudwa who are not aware of the FBW policy. 
 
Lessons from South Africa’s Free Basic Water policy  
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 litres of water a day (Mehta 2005).  
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The South African government stands alone in recognising the constitutional right to 
water. This is a great achievement. Yet, despite the existence of a constitutional right to 
water and related policies, millions in South Africa are either not aware of or not given 
access to this right. Thus, a right conceived at the national level is still to be realised on 
the ground in many parts of the country. The South African case highlights several 
lessons about rights as an accountability strategy in this regard. 
 
Realising rights in practice 
The FBW policy has not been implemented in a standardised way. Water service 
providers (who could be private companies, water boards, district municipalities or 
community-based organisations) interpret the policy in different ways. In some areas, the 
right to water has also been hindered by market processes such as cost recovery, leading 
to controversial cut-offs. This chapter has demonstrated that economic and social rights 
fail to be realised owing to sins of omission (the lack of funds and institutional capacity) 
and sins of commission (where rights are knowingly put at risk). The most persistent 
stumbling block to realising the right to water are sins of omission, as outlined in the 
section on the Eastern Cape. These include capacity problems on the part of local 
authorities and financial constraints. But one may also argue that cut-offs and high 
payments are sins of commission that put poor and vulnerable people’s right to water at 
risk.  The result is that some South African citizens still do not enjoy FBW and many are 
not even aware of their constitutional right to 25 free litres of water per day. Thus there is 
very uneven access to the right to water in South Africa.  
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The South African case highlights the difficulty in apportioning blame for rights 
violations and identifying who bears obligations and responsibilities to realise rights. This 
is a generic feature of the contemporary world, in which processes of economic 
globalisation have led to the proliferation of service provision by actors other than the 
state. As we saw in Chapter 2 of this book, this confuses lines of accountability, as 
channels of representation and redress central to accountability fail to keep pace with 
dispersed responsibilities.  
 
Linking rights and poverty reduction 
The FBW has certainly made a difference to the lives of poor people by addressing health 
issues and freeing women from time taken in collecting water. Still, the issue of poverty 
reduction seems to be lagging behind, especially with regards to water required for 
agricultural production purposes. The contentious issues concerning water for subsistence 
agriculture and cultural activities need to be resolved. The General Comment provides 
that states are required to ensure each person has access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use, and this is what the 25 
litres per day per person achieves. But the Committee also states that while priority must 
be given to water for personal and domestic use, it is also important to recognise the need 
for water to meet the most essential aspects of each of the other relevant human rights 
(rights to livelihood, food, etcetera), for which the 25 litres do not suffice.  
 
One reason why rights often do not make a great difference to poor people is because 
there is a marked lack of political will on the part of powerful stakeholders to enforce 
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them in practice. The South African case highlights problems that arise when adequate 
financial resources are not provided to realise rights to water and when contradictions 
arise from market-based approaches. However, promoting the human right to water can 
only be the result of a conscious socio-political choice on the part of decision makers and 
local people. Continued attempts to mobilise around this right by communities and 
activists may provide governments with the mandate to stand by that right – for which 
they can subsequently be held to account, and which they can be pressured to enforce in 
an equitable manner. 
 
Market dynamics versus rights 
The discussion has highlighted the difficulty of implementing the principles of free basic 
water and cost recovery in tandem. The Committee clearly states that water should be 
affordable and not reduce a person’s capacity to access other essential goods such as food 
and housing.  This normally means that water must be subsidised for poor communities 
and provided free where necessary. This is the spirit of the FBW policy. But, the chapter 
has also demonstrated how cost recovery and privatisation dominate South Africa’s water 
domain. Thus water is often unaffordable and cut-offs have contradicted and violated 
people’s basic right to water. In rural areas such as the Eastern Cape, both willingness 
and ability to pay for water services were not very high, cost recovery was limited and 
there were many defaulters on payment for water use. There is thus a massive policy 
trade-off between thinking about free basic water for some and basic water for all. It is 
thus both dangerous and unrealistic to assume that cost recovery can be achieved 
amongst poor communities. When cost was an issue, a number of people continued to use 
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unprotected sources of water. Apart from health implications, the returns on investment 
for schemes where cost recovery applies could not be realised, since people did not 
always use them. It is compounded by the inherent tensions between rights-based and 
market-based frameworks, which assume and require different types of accountability 
politics. At times, though, markets may compromise social and economic rights since 
they ‘can systematically deprive some individuals in order to achieve the collective 
benefits of efficiency’ (Donnelly 1999: 628). Thus cost recovery and macroeconomic 
policies can have a direct negative impact on the right to water.  
 
The politics of claiming rights and demanding accountabilities 
Finally, how people demand accountability when their economic and social rights are 
violated is linked to the larger question of how rights are interpreted and deployed by 
local people. In urban areas, famous cases such as Grootboom (named after Irene 
Grootboom) have highlighted how poor people can be agents of change as they appeal to 
the Constitutional Court to advance their constitutional rights to basic services. In 2000, 
residents of Wallacedene, a large shantytown in the Cape Town area, made legal history 
when the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of their housing rights. Today, four years 
on, the people behind the historic Wallacedene settlement are still waiting for proper 
housing facilities. In fact, as one commentator argues, the only concrete building that the 
residents have is a stinking ablution block with broken pipes and inadequate sanitation 
(Schoonakev 2004). Since the Constitutional Court failed to specify which manifestation 
of the state – national, provincial or local – should honour the rights of the residents, 
there is a lack of clarity on where the locus of responsibility lies with regard to the 
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implementation of the Grootboom judgement. The Constitutional Court also did not play 
any role in supervising or overseeing the implementation of the various orders, and the 
South Africa Human Rights Commission is only playing a monitoring role. Residents are 
angry because they now do not know where to turn. This highlights the difficulty of 
specifying duty bearers and their responsibilities in implementing economic and social 
rights.  
 
In remote rural areas such as the Eastern Cape, the capacity of citizens to claim their 
constitutional rights to basic services is far lower than in the cities. Many people are not 
aware of their constitutional right to water. Therefore, they are less likely to hold the 
government to account if their rights are violated. In part this is because of their 
ignorance of these rights, and in part it is because the mediators of justice (courts, 
lawyers, activists) are more likely to operate in metropolitan areas than in remote rural 
ones.  
 
These problems should not detract from the fact that constitutional endorsements to social 
and economic rights are very important. In acknowledging the right to water, the South 
African government has gone against the grain of conventional wisdoms, both on 
questions of the rights and entitlements of citizens and as reflected in donor debates on 
water provision. In this respect, the FBW is a remarkable achievement. Defending the 
constitutional right to water, poor people have successfully moved the courts to grant 
interim relief from disconnections. However, in order for rights to be more effective, 
attention needs to be paid to the caveats presented here: the lack of attention to poverty 
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and livelihood questions; the problematic implementation of the policy; the lack of 
awareness; and the variable levels of accountability mechanisms to provide redress.  
 
Implications for accountability  
With the inclusion of new private actors, states are not merely enforcers of rights, but 
increasingly act as regulators and facilitators of rights (INTRAC 2003). Unfortunately, 
the General Comment and other such instruments do not explicitly identify private actors 
as accountable and responsible. Ironically, too, rights are denied at the ‘behest of powers 
beyond the state itself’ (INTRAC 2003: 3). For example, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank policies oblige states to curtail basic services and impose charges 
that exclude large numbers of vulnerable people. In this sense, global pressures have led 
to the state assuming a schizophrenic role as both the enforcer and violator of rights. Only 
the state can properly regulate the behaviour of markets and ensure that economic actors 
operate in a fair and transparent manner; only the state can provide adequate social 
protection to those who suffer insecurity and a loss of rights (ICHRP 2004: 60). But 
governments also become violators of rights by enforcing policies and programmes such 
as privatisation and structural adjustment that can erode people’s rights. Protective 
provisions do exist. For example, under the Water Service Act no disconnections can take 
place on the grounds of inability to pay. But the onus of proving ability lies with the 
water user and will depend on the user’s ability to access legal advice and representation 
– a minimal resource in many communities (COHRE 2004: 54). Thus links between 
ordinary citizens and their representatives in South Africa have become obscured through 
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policy shifts towards GEAR and orthodox forms of neoliberal economic globalisation. 
This makes tracking processes of accountability difficult across these multiple scales.  
 
This should not detract from the fact that rights do and should matter. The right to water is 
internationally recognised by both developing and industrialised countries as defined in 
General Comment 15. It includes clearly defined and realisable obligations, and thus 
forms the basis of concrete negotiations between the state, the communities concerned and 
civil society advocates. Moreover, the right to water in principle provides justiciable 
components to local claims and struggles around water and can also be used as a 
countervailing force against the commodification of water, which can impinge on poor 
people’s rights. That few people in South Africa or around the world are demanding 
compliance and answerability on the right to water is another matter. But local struggles to 
realise the right to water are on the rise and the demand for accountability from water 
providers and those responsible for protecting this right will also therefore increase. If 
human rights are really to make a difference, we can only hope that more attention will be 
paid to the accountability mechanisms through which compliance and answerability 
become an indispensable aspect of the human rights regime.  
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